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The preservation of indigenous accounting systems  
in a subaltern community    
Abstract 
Purpose - The paper examines how indigenous accounting practices are mobilised in 
the daily life of a subaltern community, and how and why the members of that 
community have managed to preserve such practices over time despite external 
pressures for change.   
Methodology/approach - An ethno-methodological field study is employed to 
produce a text informing the ways in which people engage in social accounting 
practices. It uses the concepts of ‘structuration theory’ to understand how indigenous 
accounting systems are shaped by the interplay between the actions of agents and 
social structures.  
Findings - The case study suggests that it is not literacy, social capital and trust, 
institutional support, or emotional imperatives that tend to ‘preserve’ and ‘sustain’ 
indigenous accounting systems, but the strongly prevailing patronage based political 
system, as mobilised into the subaltern social structure, which makes individuals 
unable to change. Social accounting is seen as the common language of the 
inhabitants in their everyday life, as sanctioned by the unique form of autonomy-
dependency relationship shaped by patronage politics.   
Originality - This is the first empirical study that focuses on how and why  local 
‘subaltern’ communities preserve their indigenous accounting practices over time. 
This contrasts with previous work that has focussed on the presence or absence of 
accounting in ‘beyond work organisations’.  
Research implications – The findings implicate that any form of rational 
transformations in indigenous accounting systems in local subaltern communities first 
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requires a deconstruction analysis of any prevailing and dominant patronage political 
system.  
Key words - Indigenous social accounting system, preservation, subaltern 
community, patronage political system, duality of structure, dialectic of control, 
systems of accountability. 
Paper category -  Research paper. 
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Introduction 
The presence and effect of accounting categories and records ‘beyond work 
organisations’, such as those found in homes and small communities, have largely 
remained unexplored since initial calls for accounting to be studied in such 
environments (Gambling, 1974; Choudhury, 1988). This paper explores how and why 
‘indigenous accounting practices’ have been preserved in a ‘subaltern’ community in 
rural Sri Lanka despite external pressures for change.  In particular, it examines how 
these accounting practices are mobilised in the daily life of the community and how 
and why members of the community have managed to preserve these practices from 
generation to generation.  
 
Recently, Jacobs and Kemps (2002) studied accounting presences and absences in the 
daily life of three small traders in Bangladesh and concluded that the extent to which 
accounting is present or absent in the life of these people is explained by the level of 
literacy and levels of social capital. Other studies such as Gallhofer and Chew (2000), 
Northcott and Doolin (2000), Walker and Llewellyn (2000), Jacobs and Walker 
(2004), and Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2007) have also provided some 
understanding of how accounting operates beyond work organisations. However, such 
studies fail to explore questions as to why and how indigenous accounting practices 
are preserved or transformed in such organisations. For example, how and why a 
particular society keeps or abandons part or all of its indigenous accounting practice, 
especially in the context of external pressures for rational transformations (e.g. from 
the state and non-government organisations (NGOs)) remains empirically unexplored. 
Answers to such questions require researchers to go beyond the identification of 
accounting presences or absences, and need the application of ‘phenomenological 
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understanding’ of how accounting ideas are mobilised into indigenous social relations 
and social systems (e.g. informal credit and financing systems), which is the focus of 
this study.  
 
Such an approach will open up new channels of discourse, and provides a broader 
understanding of ‘indigenous accounting systems’, as particularly featured in 
politically less-represented ‘subaltern communities’, that characterise many less 
developed countries (LDCs). Such, non elite, subaltern communities (Guha, 1982; 
Spivak, 1988) [i] present specific characteristics, generally reflecting continuing 
degrees of literacy expression, both ‘written’ and ‘oral’, that have produced imperfect 
or incomplete literate cultures (Ong, 1982; Goody, 1987). These subalterns 
communities cannot speak or represent and, instead, are embedded within the 
dominant discourses [ii], such as those relating to economic development and poverty 
alleviation (Spivak, 1988; Green, 2002), and display vulnerability given the 
micrological texture of power relations with local and regional level elites. 
 
This study contributes to and extends the existing work in this area, such as 
Choudhury (1988), Gallhofer and Chew (2000), Northcott and Doolin (2000), Walker 
and Llewellyn (2000), and Jacobs and Kemps (2002) in two respects. First, it 
examines accounting in a broader context to include both ‘oral’ and ‘written’ aspects,  
while previous studies in the area have narrowly focused on accounting in terms of 
formal record keeping, such as, debtors’ records (see for instance, Jacobs and Kemps, 
2002). Second, and also in contrast to previous studies, we examine why and how 
indigenous accounting systems have survived and been preserved over the years 
despite improved literacy levels and external pressures for change.  
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The empirical setting of the study is an indigenous fishing community in a rural 
village (Kalametiya) in Sri Lanka, characterised by strong oral characteristics [iii]. We 
adopt Giddens structuration theory (Giddens 1979, 1984, 1991) as a sensitising device 
to understand how accounting is embedded in the daily life of community members 
and how indigenous accounting practices have been preserved over the years. In 
particular, structuration theory enables us to understand how such accounting systems 
are shaped by the interplay of the actions of agents on the one hand and the social 
structures on the other hand.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review 
relevant literature on the role of accounting beyond the formal work organisations, 
particularly in subaltern communities. Structuration theory is then presented as the 
theoretical framework informing our analysis. This is followed by a brief description 
of the research method, ahead of the presentation of case results and their discussion. 
The final section provides some concluding comments.  
 
Accounting beyond formal work organisations 
Accounting beyond formal work organisations, with particular regard to ‘micro-level 
social accounting practices’, remains largely unreported in the accounting literature, 
despite its long recognition as a valid research field (Gambling 1974; Choudhury, 
1988; Hopwood, 1983, 1994; Morgan and Wilmott, 1993; Miller, 1995; Walker, 
1998; Boden, 1999). By focussing on household production in national accounts in 
the context of macro-social accounting systems, Gambling (1974) initiated the idea of 
a hierarchical model of ‘societal accounting’ and argued for the integration of three 
levels of accounts in practice, namely the mini-accounts of households, micro-
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accounts and state level macro-accounts (see also Walker and Llewellyn, 2000). 
Hopwood (1983, 1994) emphasised the need for increased research on accounting and 
accountabilities in the every day life and cultures of people, and in support of the 
views Miller (1995) demanded a renewed focus on accounting as a social and 
institutional practice, rather than a simple rational mechanism. Extending the 
discussion, Morgan and Wilmott (1993) proposed a new form of accounting research 
to explain how individuals are affected by accounting, while Boden (1999) in her 
study of financial accounting and accountability among the self employed reflected 
the increasing need for micro-level analyses in accounting research and the 
importance of studying accounting practices in every day life. Walker’s (1998) 
investigation specifically focussed on the role accounting plays in people’s social life 
with particular regard to how the maintenance of accounting records in the private 
sphere contributed to masculine domination of individuals within middle class 
families. 
 
The two special issues published by the Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal (AAAJ) under the themes of ‘accounting and indigenous peoples’ (2000, Vol. 
13, No 3) and ‘accounting at home’ (2000, Vol. 13, No. 4) promoted the idea of 
conducting accounting research beyond conventional organisational settings and 
demanded accounting researchers’ attention for ‘social accounting practices’. In 
particular, the papers published in these two issues explored the importance of 
undertaking accounting research in the field of household, individual, family and 
indigenous communities, identifying two different avenues of accounting research in 
the sub-field of ‘social accounting’.  
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Papers published in the first special issue (AAAJ, 2000, 13:3) focussed on the 
relationship between western accounting practice and indigenous peoples and their 
cultures, and investigated the impact of such accounting and accountability systems, 
as engineered by the state/governments, on indigenous peoples (Gallhofer and Chew, 
2000; Greer and Patel, 2000). Findings indicated how western accounting has 
contributed to the oppression, dispossession and silencing of indigenous people’s 
voices worldwide (Gallhofer et al., 2000), with studies of indigenous aboriginal 
Australians, Gibson (2000) and Greer and Patel (2000) specifically highlighting how 
the government, by introducing narrow notions of accounting and accountability 
measures for indigenous organisations and representative bodies, displaced more 
holistic social values in an attempt to achieve narrowly defined economic values 
alongside greater social equity.  
 
The papers contained in the second special issue focussing on “accounting at home” 
(AAAJ, 2000, 13:4) attempted to reveal how accounting is being practiced by 
households and to show similarities of accounting systems prescribed for the domestic 
scene with those practices adopted in business (see Allen, 1977). For example, 
Walker and Llewellyn (2000) investigated how such accounting techniques are 
employed in household daily life in terms of family budgeting, household production, 
gender accountability, as well as matters such as divorce. Northcott and Doolin’s 
(2000) study of home accountants in western society showed how widespread use of 
business jargon, computer packages, and advisory services has created a particular 
mass of ‘home accountants’ with some accounting literacy. Pahl (2000) revealed how 
financial arrangements of married and as-married couples reflect the economic 
position of their households, the relative incomes of spouses/partners, and the 
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fundamental aspects of their relationship. Similarly, Komori and Humphrey (2000) 
explored the development of household accounting practice in post-war Japan through 
a review of reported experiences of the winners of the annual accounting prizes 
scheme organised since 1954 by the Central Council of Saving Information.  
 
As an additional strand of related research, there is branch of literature focussing on 
the reasons for the ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ of written accounting beyond formal work 
organisations. One aspect of this sub-literature argues that absence of formal written 
accounting is due to practices of historically constructed pre-literate forms of 
accounting (Keister, 1963; Schmandt-Besserat, 1992; Baxter, 1994). This view is 
supported in recent studies by Jayasinghe (2006) and Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe 
(2007) reporting how families and communities with less-literate cultures use 
customary thoughts and pre-literate ‘oral accounting’ calculations. Such studies 
suggest that accounting in such communities, homes and by individuals comprises of 
a set of distinctively fabricated lay conceptions rather than an act of ‘writing and 
examination’. As an alternative emphasis, the sub-literature focuses on the  
relationship between literacy and accounting, treating literacy as a pre-condition for 
the development of accounting (Littleton, 1933; Choudhury, 1988). In particular, 
Choudhury (1988) argued that the presence or absence of written accounting can be 
interpreted as a form of pathological non-presence (e.g. lack of literacy) or as a virtue 
(e.g. presence of social capital and trust). In support of this argument, Jacobs and 
Kemp’s (2002) case studies of individual traders/shop keepers in Bangladesh explored 
how the ‘presence and absence’ of written accounting at  such local community level 
could be explained by the lack of literacy, describing how the less-literate shop 
keepers in their study started to keep records once they learnt to read and write. 
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Furthermore, their studies showed that levels of social capital, defined as norms of 
reciprocity and trust, could also play an active role in understanding the absence of 
written accounting in traditional society (see also, Neu, 1991). Finally, a further 
related branch of the sub-literature argues that the presence or absence of written 
accounting is depended on the absence or presence of proper institutional influence, 
e.g. banks, tax agencies (Boden, 1999).  
 
However, despite the focus on the presence or absence of written accounting practice 
beyond formal work organisations, no studies have explicitly examined why and how 
indigenous accounting practices have been ‘preserved’ or ‘transformed’ over the 
years. It has generally been found that, despite improved literacy levels and external 
pressures for rational transformations (e.g. by state and NGOs), individuals and local 
community level organisations still retain part or all of their indigenous accounting 
practices. However, this issue remains empirically unexplored, with the narrow focus 
of the social accounting sub-literature emphasising formal record keeping, such as, 
debtors’ records (see, for instance, Jacobs and Kemps, 2002), and ignoring the issue 
of the preservation of indigenous accounting systems. In response, our study extends 
the research agenda beyond the identification of accounting presences or absences, 
and presents an attempt to understand phenomenologically how accounting ideas are 
mobilised into indigenous social relations and social systems in terms of, for example, 
informal credit and financing systems. In contrast to previous research in the area, we 
examine accounting in a broader context to include both ‘oral’ and ‘written’ and 
explain why and how these indigenous accounting systems have survived over the 
years despite external pressures for change, with a particular emphasis on subaltern 
communities in LDCs.  
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Theoretical framework: structuration theory  
In order to interpret and understand how indigenous accounting systems are shaped by 
the interplay of the actions of agents on the one hand and social structures on the other 
hand, we employ Giddens structuration theory (Giddens 1979, 1984, 1991) as a 
sensitising device to understand how accounting is mobilised into the every day life of 
community members, and how and why such accounting practices have been 
preserved over the years. We have been motivated by previous studies in the 
accounting literature that have invoked structuration theory as background (e.g. 
Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Capps et al., 1989; Macintosh and Scapens, 1990; 
Dirsmith et al., 1997; Lawrence et al., 1997; Johanson et al., 2001; Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2002; Buhr, 2002; Granlund, 2003; Seal et al., 2004; Coad and Cullen, 
2006; Jayasinghe, 2006), while accepting that not all researchers agree on its 
appropriate form or utility (e.g. Boland, 1993, 1996; Burns, 2000; Dillard et al., 2004; 
Coad and Cullen, 2006). These studies have generally employed structuration theory 
to explain the parallels between conceptualisation and the practical operation of 
accounting systems. For instance, using Giddens’ notions of ‘structuration theory’, as 
a general perspective on social life, Roberts and Scapens (1985) explained how 
accounting systems and systems of accountability constructs the meaning of 
structures, moral order and power relations in work organisations, and attempted to 
interpret how accounting regularises organisational functioning across time and space.  
 
Giddens theorises a middle course between objectivism and subjectivism through his 
concept of ‘the duality of structure’ and focuses on reciprocal action of human actors 
and social structure. In his language, social structure is both the medium and outcome 
of the reproduction of practices. He explains ‘systems’ as the visible patterns or forms 
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of interdependence between individuals and groups in organisations whereas 
‘structures’ relate to the systems of generative rules and resources which provide the 
binding of time and space in social systems, even though existing outside time and 
space. These socially constructed structures constitute agents and social practices, and 
both enable and constrain the actions of human agencies. According to Giddens 
understanding interactions in terms of agents drawing upon and thereby reproducing 
particular modalities of structuration provides insights into the specific systems 
adopted in organisations.  He identifies three ‘modalities of structuration’ for agential 
actions: interpretive schemes of communication (signification), norms for sanctioning 
social action (legitimation) and facilities for the exercise of power in bringing about 
outcomes (domination) (Giddens, 1979, p. 82)   
 
Giddens also theorises the agents as the purposeful, knowledgeable, reflexive actors 
who know a great deal about the conditions and consequences of what they do in their 
everyday lives (Giddens, 1984, p. 281). It is through the actions and reflective 
monitoring of their actions that agents sustain their every day lives and social 
structures are constituted producing Giddens’ ‘duality of social structure’. As such, 
social structures are viewed as shaping people’s actions whilst people’s actions 
constitute, reproduce and change the social structures. Giddens’ argument that 
structures serve as the medium of actions, as provided through memory (Giddens, 
1979, p. 5) implies a recognition of agents knowledge with regard to behaviour and 
responsive actions in social relations (Giddens, 1979, p. 64).  
 
In the few accounting studies that have explicitly employed Giddens’ concepts and 
terminology, the term ‘accounting systems’ in organisations is interpreted as abstract 
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potential systems, whereas the systems in use are ‘systems of accountability’ (Roberts 
and Scapens, 1985; Roberts, 1990). As such, accounting systems are viewed as 
presenting a body of rules and resources for organisational actors which are drawn 
upon in the practice of accounting whilst accounting systems as whole only continue 
by being produced and reproduced by organisational actors drawing from and thereby 
reproducing ‘structures’ in particular contexts of interaction. In this context the word 
‘accountability’ is interpreted in a broader sense, referring to the giving and 
demanding of reasons for conduct and features of daily conduct which are being 
shaped and maintained by accounting information (Roberts and Scapens, 1985).  
 
These studies also present accounting as a language which provides organisation 
members with a set of categories (e.g. cost, profit, credit, return on investment) or 
system of relevance as a part of a broader ‘structure of meaning’ in terms of which 
their actions are orientated, e.g. making sense about the past, anticipating the future, 
planning and assessing actions (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). In addition, the study 
findings imply that accounting systems embody a ‘moral order’ in terms of a complex 
system of reciprocal rights and obligations of people (supported by positive and 
negative sanctions such as financial incentives and career prospects) to hold others to 
account for their actions (e.g. performance measures, budgets), and institutionalise the 
notion of accountability (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Roberts, 1990; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). This view emphasises how accounting practices involve the operation 
of power relations or a system of domination through some form of accountability 
(e.g. through imposing a particular framework of categories such as cost, profit, etc., 
upon organisational members). On the whole, structuration based studies conclude 
that the understanding of interactions in terms of individuals drawing upon and 
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thereby reproducing particular structures of meaning, moral order and power, 
provides insights into the specific systems of accountability within organisations.   
 
Accounting structures organise time by accounting periods involving, and represented 
by, regular reports, budgets and appraisals, together with their related practices. 
Accounting practices create a strict temporal order for organisations, and boundaries 
of systems of accountability provide for the binding of organisational time and space 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Burns and Scapens, 2000), while the operation of 
‘accountability systems’ produces and reproduces hierarchical, functional and 
divisional patterns within organisations (e.g. every employee being accountable to 
someone in the organisation), and structures them through time. In this perspective, 
researchers have argued that accounting as a language operating outside space and 
time can be viewed as a structure or structural property of a community of speakers 
that is being produced and reproduced and drawn upon by them orally in their 
interactions (e.g. Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
 
While such accounting studies based on Giddens’ concept of ‘structuration’ reflect the 
realities of social formation (and transformation), particularly within ‘formal work 
organisations’ from which accounting systems and systems of accountability can be 
conceived, we argue that these applications can equally be employed as a general 
perspective or paradigm with particularly relevance to understanding the social 
accounting calculations of subaltern communities. In this context, the elaboration and 
representation of social space in subaltern communities and the understanding of their 
underlying indigenous accounting practices, requires an examination of the anatomy 
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of its articulation in terms of two interrelated elements: oral or written accounting 
systems, and systems of accountability.  
 
Methodology  
The method of data collection for this study involved an ethnographic approach (see 
Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Geertz, 1988), where the epistemological purpose is the 
production of a detailed text informing what is happening in a particular indigenous 
setting. As Boland (1993) suggested, the focal length of the researcher, in viewing 
structuration processes ‘in close-up’ or ‘at a distance’ may shape the ways in which 
these processes are observed and interpreted. This means that it is necessary to 
observe individuals’ actions as they go about their activities, and to uncover the 
actors’ own understandings of relevant meanings, norms and power relations. As 
Spivak (1988) argued “the major problem with a subaltern research project is that it 
requires one not only to know the consciousness and position of the subaltern but also 
to represent that consciousness” (p. ??). In this case, we believe that, as an interpretive 
method, ethnography has the ability to bring under-represented subaltern voices and 
consciousness into the foreground of debates on accounting and subaltern research 
and show the deviation of subaltern practices from the ideal and situate them 
historically (Guha, 1982).  
 
The detailed research evidence for our epistemologically based case study was 
directly generated from prolonged contact with, and observation of, ‘actors’ who 
shared a common organisational environment. The actions, interpretations and 
rationalisations of each actor were observed in close-up and in repeated instances, 
with particular regard to their daily face-to-face contact and interaction with each 
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other, in order to better and more fully appreciate the use and impact of accounting 
information within the whole context of their relationships. Particular attention was 
given to understanding different oral accounting systems assimilated within people’s 
daily economic life and behaviour patterns. As described in the next section the 
chosen case study site, in rural Sri Lanka, presents a ‘subaltern’ village location 
providing us with a ‘mirror face’ to understand the nature of oral or written 
accounting systems and systems of accountability of its inhabitants.   
 
The main data collection mode involved conducting semi-structured interviews with 
individuals. Each interview took approximately two hours (using the local native 
Sinhalese language), with the main subject matter comprising the ways in which 
people are engaged in the community’s main economic activity of fishing and fish 
trading. The categories of people interviewed comprised of small-fishermen (small 
craft-owners and fish-workers), fish-merchants (mudalalis), specific elites (School 
Principal and local state fishery agent (patabandi arachchi), heads of local 
organisations (e.g. fishermen’s cooperative society), and professionals from poverty 
alleviation agencies (both governmental and non-governmental). In order to capture 
the specific modes of accounting practices of these peoples, 28 interviews were 
undertaken over a six-month period. The interviews took the form of guided 
conversations (MacNeill, 1990), where the interviewee pursued topics and raised 
themes of interest within certain broad areas as prompted by the interviewer. The 
information generated included background details regarding respondents, their roles, 
tasks and relations both in family and society, accounting systems employeded to 
daily catch-fish sharing, informal credit, and financial management.  
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Interviews took place in two stages. The first involved the interviewer becoming 
socialised with respondents, allowing preliminary observations regarding the latter’s 
everyday life, and enabling further appointments to be arranged for in-depth 
interviewing at the second stage, during which detailed conversations took place 
regarding specific issues. Following the interviews, an attempt was made to compare 
the ‘verbal data’ with available documentation and reports. The purpose of this 
attempt was to enhance validity and reliability, with the most commonly used 
documents derived from detailed village resource profiles as previously collected 
(Abeysuriya and Jayasinghe, 2000). As part of this validation process, some 
participative observations were also made. As the ‘outsiders’ to this village, 
contributing to a greater understanding through physical observations of the 
community and its activities, in terms of overall ‘harbour culture’ and fishing rituals, 
making the ethnographic texts more graphic.  
 
Data analysis employed the theoretical categorisation of accounting systems and 
systems of accountability framework in terms structures of meaning, moral order and 
power. Initially, this involved transcriptions to construct narratives from which was 
derived a single text of the story implicated with prevailing accounting systems and 
economic calculations therein. This was followed by textual analysis to generate 
interrelated stories, based on the three theoretical categories, with interpretations 
made with the help of theoretical insights, with particular regard to identifying the 
prevailing accountability systems. Finally, an iterative process was adopted - theory to 
data and data to theory - in order to provide a critical analysis of the empirical data 
(see Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).  
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Empirical context  
 
The research site of Kalametiya fishing village, is located in Hambantota district 
within the Southern Province of Sri Lanka and on the country’s extreme southern 
coastline. The subaltern group within the village are largely engaged in the fishing 
industry, and they tend to be influenced by a few powerful elites (e.g. patabandi 
arachchi, fish-merchants/Mudalalis) who have control over village political economy.  
 
Due to the potential for profit earning being constrained by two major factors - lack of 
capital inputs and adverse climatic conditions - Kalamatyia village, as part of the 
Hambantota district generally, has remained marginalised and poor. All work, living 
and recreation spheres of Kalametiya’s inhabitants are located inside the village 
boundary, presenting the characteristics of a ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1969) [iv] 
(see Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007). Like many other Sinhalese villages, it is 
a traditional settlement with extended families and kinship relations, where the 
household and extended family is the main socio-economic unit, and the eldest male 
is the economic decision maker. The family unit promotes social unity and individual 
esteem, such as social status, largely derived from one’s caste identity rather than 
individual achievements, with caste being highly determinative in the construction of 
social identity for the purposes of marriages, occupations, ceremonies and gatherings. 
The dominating caste in Kalametiya is called Karawa, which is ranked second in the 
system’s social stratification. High poverty levels require that children give up 
education at a very early age, and assume the responsibilities for helping their families 
with many of them starting fisheing-related careers with their fathers. 
Located in a natural harbour the Kalametiya village economy is almost exclusively 
fishing based with subaltern group fisher-folk and/or owners of small fishing craft. 
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The village supplies fish to other localities and to the main fish market. A few elite 
fish-merchants, ‘mudalalis’, influence the business and monopolise fish production 
and distribution in manifold ways. As well as using both their own and hired 
mechanised craft, they hire workers for their craft, they buy the entire fish-catch from 
the small fishermen at lowest prices, handle the distribution network with city 
markets, prevent outside traders from involvement, and provide credit facilities to 
small fishermen to buy input materials needed for fishing trips. Elite mudalalis 
exclusively own the modern equipment and production technology required for multi-
day fishing craft, and use drift-net, long line and trawl line as their fishing gear. As 
such, their fish production is not affected by seasonal changes, and they are capable of 
middle distance operations (beyond 40km) spending 7 to 28 days at sea. While this 
multi-day fishing is highly capital intensive, the involvement of the owners in 
production is minimal and in stark contrast to small fishermen restricted to small 
fishing-craft with inboard or outboard engines and a limited offshore fishing range. 
This economic power of mudalalis is reflected in their socio-economic relations with 
the marginalised fishermen limited to ‘patronage’ relationships with mudalalis in 
order to obtain economic benefit.  
 
During the last two decades, several NGOs operating under the auspices and direction 
of the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have attempted to 
alleviate village poverty through the modernisation of traditional fishing craft, 
providing finance, introducing new fishing vessels and fishing gear, developing the 
fishing harbour and anchorages, and managing broader coastal fisheries. These 
initiatives were mainly undertaken by the Fisheries Co-operative Society (FCS) 
formed by fisher-folk themselves, while the state, through the devices of the 
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Department of Fisheries and the Department of Cooperatives, supervised its process. 
However, the roles performed by the FCS are politically influenced and manipulated 
by the elites, often holding high official posts within the FCS and also operating as 
state representatives of the state and national level political parties. The combined 
domination of regional and local elite groups and their opportunistic behaviour with 
regard to the fishermen group make the latter   ‘subalternists’ in the village political 
economy.  
 
Accounting systems and systems of accountability in Kalametiya 
Given the empirical background, this section specifically examines the mobilisation 
of oral or written accounting systems and systems of accountability in the socio-
cultural and political economic context of Kalametiya fisher village, with regard to 
various aspects.    
 
Accounting period 
In Kalametiya, the concept of value does not conform to an ‘accounting period’, being 
distorted by the notion of seasonality and inconsistency of production output. The 
people engaged in fish production still use the bimodal pattern of rainfall in Sri Lanka 
- Haraya (peak season) (monsoon period, November to April) and Warakan (off 
season) (monsoon period, May to October) (Amarasinghe, 2006; Jayasinghe, 2006) - 
as the basis for financial planning and accounting at home and in their enterprise. In 
order to overcome the problem of seasonality of fishing operations, and to allow for 
year-round fishing, small-scale fishermen have attempted to mechanise their 
traditional craft, achieved by which simply attaching a small  outboard engine. 
However, there is still a high dependency on traditional fishing modes, e.g. oruwa 
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(outrigger canoe), which constrains sailing in poor weather conditions, reflecting an 
embedded and inherent caution for change because of traditions, customs, religion, or 
past practices. 
 
This tendency to avoid calculative risks associated with change, militates against 
entrepreneurialism. The principal of the local school took the view:     
“The small fishermen in this village earn good income during the peak fishing 
season (haraya). In fact, during the peak season there is a massive waste in 
fish resource because fishermen fail to sell their entire fish-catch as it often 
exceeds the demand. But, they do not think about preserving or processing 
those fish surplus to cater for the off-seasonal (warakan) market. They already 
have the indigenous knowledge for such enterprise. … …They don’t need a 
huge capital investment and training to initiate such activities, as they are 
already doing it on a small scale in their homes, for their daily consumption. 
But they don’t like to change their traditional life style. They enjoy their life 
during the peak-season, as they earn better income. But often they struggle 
when they face the off-season.”  
 
This ideology seems to be crucial in that people believe lucrative income can only be 
earned in the haraya period. A young school leaver who is now involved in fishing 
reasoned:   
“I had my school education up to Ordinary Level and then I followed a 
Satellite Sound Reader Course at the Fisheries Training College, Tangalle. But 
I realised I can’t find a job with those qualifications to fit with my current 
income that I earn from the sea. Now I am independent, and I have my own 
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craft and fishing nets. I like this job (sea-fishing) and enjoy my life. Actually, I 
earn an average net income of Rs. 1000-1200 (per day) during the peak-season 
(haraya) that I would never be able to find from another job (for my paper 
qualifications). One day I may give up this job, but only if I find a job with 
better income.” 
 
The evidence suggests that the village’s ‘production technology’ does not conform to 
rational economic ideals, and that traditional cultural and political ramifications have 
overridden and dominated any rational mobilisation of resources. The matching of 
prevailing ‘accounting systems’ with seasonal patterns of production sees people 
tending to base, plan and organise their family and enterprise activities on ‘seasonal 
accounting periods’.   
 
Cost determination and profit sharing 
Similar to any other business, fish production generates various fixed overhead costs 
and variable costs in its total costs calculation. The former costs incurred by a fishing 
unit, whether or not it engages in fishing and regardless of output level, covers 
depreciation of craft and gear, interest payments on borrowed loan capital and 
imputed interest on own capital, etc. (Amarasinghe, 2006), and are mainly faced by 
the fish merchants as they are the owners of capital assets such as fishing crafts and 
fish-nets.  
 
Those operational costs such as fuel and ice (for refrigerating catch) that do change as 
the level of output varies, and incurred in fishing trips, are categorised as variable 
costs. The fishermen borrow the money from the fish merchants to buy basic 
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production inputs, i.e. engine oil, petrol, or alternatively in some cases may receive 
these items directly from the fish-merchants with the costs later deducted from the 
daily fish production revenue of the small fishermen who also hire fishing boats from 
the fish merchants. The evidence shows that fish merchants take a fixed rate of 50% 
from the daily fish-catch to cover their fixed and variable expenses. As a fish-
merchant stated:  
“I take 50% of the fishermen’s daily fish-landing because I must recover my 
cost of the boat and other maintenance expenses. I take another ¼ to cover my 
running expenses (e.g. fuels, oil, ice-cubes).”    
Among small fishermen, it was not possible to trace any personal documents showing 
such fixed and variable costs of daily fish production, as they avoid any formal record 
keeping or writing relating to their work. Although it was found that the fish-
merchants keep some temporal records in the form of a ‘total catch-fish revenue 
record’, ‘cash book’ or ‘debtor-list’ in order to make sure that they collect all their 
debts and revenues from the small fishermen, this system is no way comparable to 
any system of double-entry book keeping or formal system of accounting. A fish-
merchant said: 
“I do not know about book keeping. But, I keep some records on the money I 
give to fishermen. Also, I keep some notes on my daily incomes”. 
In Kalametiya, the sharing of revenues/profits is based on the historically determined 
concept called of ‘catch fish sharing system’. All key actors in the village fish-market 
(including small fishermen) are agreed on and apply these decision rules and 
subconsciously and instinctively abide by them. For example, it is a social rule that 
the entire fish landing is sold to the native elite mudalalis. Such rules are, on the one 
hand, linked to patronage relations established with the mudalalis and, on the other 
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hand, mobilised in agents’ practical consciousness producing particular calculable 
rationalities. If people break these accepted rules, the consequences are viewed as 
economically ‘life-threatening’, and the maintenance of such rules is believed to be a 
right and necessary practice. As a young, small scale fisherman remarked:  
“I own my own fishing-craft. Every day, I used to share my daily fish-landing 
with my fishing partner (hawulkaraya/ganikaru). Everyday, I get 50% share 
from our daily fish-catch because I have my own capital employed for the 
fishing trips. Then, I am getting another 1/2 of the remaining 50% and my 
helper owns the next half. It means he receives only 1/4 of the total fish-catch. 
We all obey this system without any negotiation because it is a system in 
which our predecessors invented.” 
In non-traditional fishing, both capital (craft) owner and labour (fish worker) receive 
equal shares, whereas in traditional fishing, capital receives 1/3 and labour 2/3 from 
each fishing trip. This system helps the craft owners pool the risk of loss of 
operational capital expenditure (e.g. depreciation or damage to craft and nets) when 
fishing is poor. If the catch is zero, the owner does not lose the operational capital 
expenditure, because it is deducted from the proceeds of the following trip before the 
proceeds are distributed. According to the system adopted in catch-sharing by multi-
day craft, operational capital expenditure on the fishing trip is deducted first from the 
total proceeds, and the rest is then divided between the owner (payment for capital) 
and the crew (payment for labour). A worker in a small multi-craft said: 
“We have a common agreement of catch-fish sharing. Normally, there is 
minimum of 4 fish-workers engaged in those 28 days fishing trips. Each crew 
member receives 1/8 of the total fish-catch and 50% owned by the mudalali 
(fish-merchant) for his boat ownership.”    
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In general, it is evident that the owner’s share is higher for mechanised craft than for 
traditional craft, due to the high degree of capital intensity of such craft.  
 
Another aspect of catch-fish sharing in Kalametiya traditionally allows people who 
are not involved in daily fishing trip activities to take some of the fish catch for 
domestic and family consumption. Neither the craft owners nor the crew object to this 
fish-catch distribution as they all recognise this tradition as a form of livelihood 
assistance. In many instances, non-active fisher-folks - often old, retired, disabled 
fishers or members of families whose breadwinner has died - render essential services 
such as removing fish from the fishing-nets (see Amarasinghe, 2006). A fish-worker 
stated: 
“My job is removing fish, cleaning and repairing the nets. I can not do fishing 
because I am now too old.”    
According to the villagers, this form of fish-catch sharing was historically known as 
raula kapanawa (shaving off beard) and could be regarded as moral principles of ‘the 
right to subsistence’ and ‘the norm of reciprocity’ (Scott, 1976) embedded in the 
norms and customs of Kalametiya’s fishing community.   
 
Labour costing  
Similar features were seen in relation to the ‘labour costing system’ operating in 
Kalametiya, relating to two distinct forms of labour: traditional labour mobilised by 
reciprocity, patronage and kinship, and the new pattern of labour associated with the 
advent of new deep-sea technology required for multi-day craft operations, where 
many of the functions performed by the traditionally experienced fish-workers 
(marakkalahe) have been taken over by modern equipment. The implications of this 
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latter development have disturbed and distorted the otherwise strong kinship links 
between the marakkalahe and mechanised craft-owners and crew-workers 
(partners/ganikaru) that have often been pervasive, with labour having been 
embedded in long-term patron-client relationships. As a crew member stated:  
“As a helper, I used to work in the same boat owned by our mudalali for more 
than five years now. I enjoy every trip and he treats me very well. Even, he 
helps me when I experience any financial difficulties. So, I am always loyal to 
him.”  
 
The close knowledge, and reliability, of one’s own kinsmen traditionally ensures a 
convenient and rewarding reciprocity.  On the one hand craft-owners obtain a 
dependable and guaranteed labour supply while, on the other, the system of labour 
recruitment guarantees employment security to the crew-workers.  
 
Such prevailing and traditional labour contracts have created complex systems of 
labour valuations and costing, differing from those in modern work organisations. 
Labour is paid on the basis of the ‘daily fish-catch (output)’ and a ‘fixed sharing-ratio’ 
(1/4 or 1/8 of fish-catch), instead of total working hours or standard piece rates per 
hour/day. However, it should be noted that with the advent of modern fishing 
technology, particularly the multi-day craft, the employer-employee relations have 
begun to undergo some faceted, if limited, changes. For example, the services of some 
fish-workers are now rated and paid on both time and effort bases, similar to modern 
work organisations, with some young fish-workers displaying a preference to work 
independently with no long-term commitments, an increased mobility from one 
employer to another as they wish, and a desire to break the traditional ideological 
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barrier of their communityas reproduced by their parents in terms of the reciprocated 
patronage and kinship relationships with employers.  
 
Asset ownership and resource allocation   
The societal and economic relationships that characterise Kalametiya are also 
reflected in the unequal resource ownership capacities of fish-merchants and 
fishermen. Rather than being equally appropriative to all parties on a rational 
accounting basis (e.g. asset ownership and average income), the concentration of 
resource ownership amongst mudalalis confirms their transformative capacity to 
exercise power over fish-workers.  
 
There is a significant disparity in the ownership of modern fishing craft and other 
equipment, e.g. fishing-nets.  Just over a quarter (28%) of fisher-folk own a fishing-
craft with the remainder having no such ownership and are either employed as fish-
workers by craft owners, or hire the craft of others on an income sharing basis (in 
terms of gross income not net profit), 1/4 for small craft, and 1/8 for large craft. As a 
poor fisherman said: 
“I can not afford my own fishing-craft. Everyday I do hire one from a 
mudalali. I have to give 50% of my fish landing to him as the hiring cost.” 
Only mudalalis also have access to expensive inboard motors and multi-day craft 
required for off-shore and deep-sea fishing. A similar pattern is to be found in the 
ownership of fishing nets, where small scale fishermen only have access to pardals 
(tiny fishing nets which can provide a relatively small catch), while mudalalis can 
afford to have mardals (mass fishing nets enabling coverage of a large area of sea and 
access to a larger catch), which are very expensive as well as labour intensive in use. 
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In conjunction with the resource ownership, there is a similar inequality with regards 
to the allocation of resources that flow into Kalametiya. Those resources, such as 
mechanised craft, fishing nets, low interest credit facilities, etc., coming from 
governmental organisations and NGOs are usually distributed through the FCS, where 
the higher and influential positions are traditionally held by the local elite (mainly 
fish-merchants), enabling them to take decisions regarding the nature and direction of 
asset allocation that favours them. 
 
The power and influence of the mudalalis ensure that  fishermen follow prescribed 
practices and procedures, which generally maintain patronage relations and specific 
arrangements such as pre-arranged fish sales (at below market prices). In all such 
arrangements, there are no apparent signs of formal accounting techniques (e.g. 
individual project appraisals or cost benefit analysis) or numbers (e.g. assets 
ownership or average income of fishermen) or reliable control procedures (e.g. third 
party authorisation, inspection or auditing) to rationalise the allocation system. For 
example, evidence showed that fish-workers and traditional craft owners adopt 
patronage relations with mudalalis to claim for newly arrived resources through the 
FCS.  A former member of the FCS said:  
“I think, our Fisheries Cooperative Society is serving for our mudalalis, not for 
us. They (mudalalis) always influence FCS decisions and activities. With the 
support of their allies every year they come to the top positions of FCS. By 
that way they control all the new benefits (such as fishing craft, nets and 
credit)”.  
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However, an in-depth investigation of FCS documents showed that there was some 
kind of record keeping and information system directed at FCS functionaries (e.g. via 
state agencies, NGOs), although the elite mudalalis do not allow its smooth-
functioning to obtain the desired results for third parties. Using their ‘respected 
figure’ image in the village, elite actors manipulate the externally imposed rational 
systems of resource allocation for their own benefit and establish tactical alliances 
with NGOs and regional and national level politicians to obtain legitimate access to 
new resources (also see Chambers, 1995; Edwards and Hume, 1995; Howell and 
Pearce, 2001).  
 
Budgeting, and financial management 
The absence of rational accounting practices in family and enterprise activities makes 
fishermen and their families in Kalametiya vulnerable to short and long-term financial 
problems. Additionally, their ‘family budgeting and financial management practice’ 
reflects the extent of the ‘emotional’ imperatives (involving a range of 
domestic/family/societal considerations) dominating their ‘rational’ imperatives (see 
Northcott and Doolin, 2000). Rational ‘accounting categories’ such as provisions, 
savings and net-income, which constitute the basic commercialisation of economic 
life (Weber, 1947) are practiced differently by these fishermen.  A small grocery man 
remarked:  
“Our fishermen earn so much money during haraya (peak-season). But spend 
for alcohol and enjoy with friends who do not involve with fishing. They used 
to buy (on credit) most of the grocery items to their family consumption from 
my grocery and borrow money from mudalalis, but unable to settle them in 
time. They have money for drinks (alcohol) but not to settle their debts. Even, 
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I have to wait and catch some of them to get my money. Their families suffer 
a lot because of this irresponsible life style of the fishermen.”   
 
Another grocery man said:       
“Our fishermen have very high expenditures during haraya, the same as the 
revenues. Especially, most of these fish-workers are addicted to alcohol and 
spend all their money to enjoy with friends. Also, they spend too much on 
fashions (e.g. buy bracelets, clothes). The ‘savings’ or ‘provisions’ for their 
future finance seem unfamiliar words to them. When they have money in 
hand, they travel by motor-cycles and three-wheelers, and rarely on foot. 
During warakan, they used to buy just single cigarettes but during haraya they 
buy at least a carton. But, when the warakan begins, these men put their heads 
down and send their women only to borrow money or buy on credit.”  
 
These two narrative quotes respectively indicate the absence and presence of ‘formal 
accounting systems’ such as budgets, records and long-term financial planning, and 
thus the extent of ‘accounting literacy’ in homes and enterprises. Observation and 
respondent evidence showed that national education is less valued by fish-worker 
families, with young children observed as leaving school-education in their early 
teens because of the economic problems of their family and an ‘obsessive’ interest in 
fishing jobs. The School Principal remarked: 
“The school children start helping their fathers (fish-workers) in their teens 
(e.g. to sort and assort the fish-catch, and pull fishing-nets). Once they reach 
teen-age, they leave school and start their own fish-worker career at sea.” 
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However, and to some extent, contrary to this view, Sri Lanka’s national census 
statistics for marine fisheries (Department of Census and Statistics, 1998) shows that 
a third of fishers in Hambantota province have completed their Junior Secondary 
School education. Although this would seem to imply that the fisher population in 
Kalametiya is reasonably educated (and literate) and able to contribute positively 
towards the management of their own fishery resources, the absence of proper 
planning, management and accounting for family and business finances has increased 
the uncertainty of individuals’ every day life and allows for the introduction and 
prominence of ‘emotions’ (e.g. insecurity and guilt) into domestic financial matters 
(see Northcott and Doolin, 2000; Walker and Llewellyn, 2000).  
 
Informal credit and financing  
In Kalametiya, traditional fishermen’s access to formal lending schemes (e.g. 
government schemes and NGOs loan programmes) is very low, due to their inability 
to offer any or appropriate collateral as demanded by lenders. Even if some schemes 
do operate effectively, the majority appear unsustainable because of high and 
subsidised costs, and high rates of default. Moreover, many formal schemes missed 
their target, with the benefits again captured by the elite fish-merchants. Where credit 
is not available, some fisher-folks have to deplete their asset base (spend savings, or 
sell valuables or livestock) or go without essential items, including food. A young 
fisherman told us: 
“Our FCS and Fisheries bank offer some loans to us to buy boats and other 
fishing equipments. But I do not have an ability to find guarantors for the 
loans because nobody in the village (means elites) come forward to take that 
risk, as I am a poor person without any steady income from the sea. How 
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could I ask such thing from someone? Even in some off-seasons which I did 
not have any income, I had to sell my livestock and pawn my wife’s jewels. 
So, everybody in the village knows that only the mudalalis obtained these 
loans, even though it was targeted to poor fishermen.”  
Some fishermen also borrow from family and friends, moneylenders, shopkeepers, 
pawnbrokers, as well as the fish-merchants (hence confirming the dependency 
relationship) while remaining vulnerable to covariate risk, i.e. risk which affects 
everyone, such as lack of production during warakan. As an alternative, based on the 
‘moral’ principle of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘reciprocity-credit’ (Scott, 1976), small 
fishermen in Kalametiya  pratice the transfer of funds among themselves in order to 
manage short-term fish-catch and income fluctuations. This mutual insurance 
mechanism, providing a cushion for consumption shocks and the risk of loss of 
operational capital gives the otherwise vulnerable small fishermen inter-temporal 
flexibility in adjusting to consumption needs, especially because of the absence of 
insurance markets dealing with the fishermen’s risk of income shortfalls (see also 
Amarasinghe, 2006).  
 
Evidence shows that Kalametiya fishermen are overwhelmingly dependent on the 
informal credit sector, with many small craft-owners forced to be tied-up in credit-
dealings with mudalalis: obtaining loans on a regular basis on the promise of handing 
over their entire future product for a specified period of time. While such credit assists 
small craft owners to finance their expenditures, their observations indicated 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of mudalalis who reportedly often cheated them. 
The small scale fishermen regularly complained that the mudalalis mostly under-
report the actual wholesale prices paid to them, with a hidden intention of charging a 
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commission and interest on the loans granted. This ‘oral calculative practice’ is never 
openly discussed or formerly recorded in books when both parties meet. As on  
fisherman stated:  
“I often borrow money from the mudalali to cover my daily expenses. He 
never asks me any guarantee. But he expects me to hand over my entire fish 
landings to him. I never ask how much I owe to him. I do not keep any records 
(or by him). But, I believe always I owe him more than I earn.”  
 
The ‘handing over’ of the products, as payment to mudalalis, is persistently 
undertaken, without considering any ‘accounting information’ or ‘records’ regarding 
the ‘total debt value’ of fishermen. As any existing transaction evidence comprises of 
‘oral records’ and ‘trust’ (see Seal et al., 1997; Tomkins, 2001), the fish merchants 
lock fishermen into ‘lifelong indebtedness’ by providing loans that are repaid through 
fish sales at pre-arranged and unfavourable (below market) prices.  The fisherman 
said: 
“Often, I suspect that the mudalali hides the actual market prices from me. 
But, I can not question him, because then in the next day I can not borrow 
money from him again.” 
 
The evidence indicates that, prior to granting informal loans, the fish merchants 
conduct simple ‘oral cash-flow analyses’ on the fishermen’s overall ability to repay 
the loan (e.g. on the basis of average daily fish-catch) rather than undertaking a 
rational investment appraisal. Sometimes, this process is linked to a successive 
programme of loans, starting small and increasing over time in pace with the 
fisherman’s capacity to repay.  
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In the next section we present an analysis of the case study data and provide a 
discussion on how indigenous accounting systems and systems of accountability are 
mobilised into the modalities of structuration. By doing so we attempt to answer our 
main research questions on why and how these indigenous accounting systems are 
being preserved at Kalametiya over time, despite external pressures and changing 
political-economic conditions.   
 
Discussion: the preservation of indigenous accounting systems 
The relationship between the social structure of Kalametiya and the agency of actors 
was evident in the case study. The indigenous ‘social accounting systems’ are 
mobilised into the every day life of fisher-folks and facilitate ‘structuration 
processes’. As the actors use some social accounting analysis and techniques for their 
personal life and enterprise level decision-making they have reconstituted the place of 
accounting within the village’s social structure enabling a ‘duality of structure’ to be 
observed. The fishermen’s memory of past structures subconsciously influence them 
to preserve the ongoing structuration processes, of which the indigenous accounting 
systems and systems of accountability is a part of. By ‘telling stories’ about prior 
practice such as the ‘catch-fish sharing system’ and suggesting their reluctance to 
change the existing accounting and finance ‘technologies’ such as fixed catch-fish 
sharing ratio and the informal financing system, which is necessary to break with the 
past, some Kalametiya actors attempt to rationalise their actions in the current 
economic environment.  
Despite the reported fact that a reasonable proportion of Kalametiya inhabitants 
would appear to be literate and have received institutional support from NGOs (in 
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terms of training and development projects) and the state (e.g. school education), they 
tend to ‘preserve’ their indigenous social accounting systems without rational 
transformation. This suggests that, rather than literacy, social capital and trust 
(Choudhury, 1988; Jacobs and Kemp, 2002), institutional support (Boden, 1999), or 
emotional imperatives (Northcott and Doolin, 2000), it is the strong ‘patronage 
political system’ that tends to preserve and sustain the indigenous accounting system. 
As the majority of inhabitants, namely small fishermen, are vulnerable within the 
micrological texture of power relations with various local and regional ‘elite’ actors, 
having no influence  and under-represented in mainstream discourses. In turn these 
‘subalterns’ are forced to adopt ‘patronage relationships’ with the elite as their 
livelihood strategy, in order to access any potential benefits. In this context, the social 
accounting practices which were mobilised into the indigenous social systems have 
indirectly facilitated the social construction process of ‘patronage relations’. While 
operating in parallel and simultaneously, the patronage political system and 
indigenous social accounting systems have shaped Kalametiya’s social agencies.   
Figure 1 
 
In this context, the prevailing and indigenous social accounting system can be seen as 
representing Giddens’ three ‘modalities of structuration’, with regards to  
signification, legitimation and domination within Kalametiya’s social environment. 
The exact form and nature of this mobilisation of the social accounting system into 
these three modalities of structuration and their parallel and simultaneous operations 
with the patronage political systems can be analysed as follows.      
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Social accounting systems and modalities of structure at Kalametiya 
In Kalametiya accounting language has become absorbed into the every day discourse 
and understandings of its actors and fed into the structuration processes (Giddens, 
1979). The social accounting systems such as catch-fish sharing, labour costing, 
budgeting, resource allocation, and informal financing have become institutionalised 
‘technical’ systems. The ‘patronised fish-market operations’ have then translated into 
a preferred financial language (e.g. catch-fish sharing system) in order to be presented 
as objective and justifiable ‘rituals’ to its inhabitants. The non-accounting ‘literate’ 
members of the ‘subaltern’ fishermen group, defer to and rely on others, mainly fish-
merchants, with regard to ‘accounting categories and numbers’ (e.g. share of profits, 
cost of labour), giving them a role in structuration processes. Thus, ‘social accounting 
practices’ have permeated Kalametiya’s actors to share ‘interpretive schemes’ (a 
‘meaning’ structure) and a ‘common language’ within the discourse of ‘patronised 
fish-market operations’.   
It is the issue of ‘prevalent ideology’, as created by the social accounting systems and 
systems of accountability, which leads to what is acceptable or culturally rational to 
the community actors, and which has motivated them to knowledgeably orientate their 
actions to the extant ‘moral order’ (legitimation structure) (Giddens, 1979, 1984; 
Roberts and Scapens, 1985). According to Giddens’ ‘structuration theory’, the rules 
and resources of social structures both shape and constrain the actions of individuals. 
That is, while actors are constrained by social norms to act in a ‘rational’ manner, 
these norms also enable actors by providing a benchmark of what is considered 
rational and acceptable behaviour. In Kalametiya the small scale fishermen have long 
maintained ‘patronage relations’ with the powerful fish-merchants and these fish-
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merchants forcibly orientate ‘legitimation structures’ to the village political economy 
away from small fishermen’s wishes, as exemplified by the fact that the fishermen are 
forced to sell their entire fish landing to native mudalalis and are not allowed to sell 
any to outsiders or the state fisheries corporation. The fish-merchants have interfered 
with the resource allocation mechanism and decide which assets would be allocated 
and to whom. Similarly, they have locked the small fishermen into lifelong 
indebtedness through their informal financing system.  
 
In this context the social accounting system has facilitated the norms for sanctioning 
local inhabitants’ actions. For instance, the fish-merchants have not kept formal 
records and accounting information on the loans granted to the fishermen and under-
report actual wholesale prices in the market in order to charge high commissions and 
interest. They have also conducted oral cash flow analyses before deciding on the 
overall ability of fishermen to pay back the loans. In sum, by using patronage and 
manipulating the ‘social accounting system’ the elite fish-merchants have created a 
system of ‘accountability’ enabling them in effect to forcibly appropriate and collect 
the entire fish-production from the fishermen.    
 
Giddens suggests that actors exercise power through their command over allocative 
resources (objects, goods, and other material phenomena) and authoritative resources 
(capability to organise and co-ordinate activities of social actors). His notion of power 
is not a pejorative one where actors necessarily impose their will upon others. Rather, 
Giddens sees power as fundamental to social interaction as a means of getting things 
done. The stories exemplified from the Kalametiya case study show how the powerful 
actors, the fish merchants, through their allocative and authoritative resources have 
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structurated unequal power relations with the small scale fishermen. In response, the 
small fishermen have adapted their agencies to, and internalised meaning structures 
within, the territory of the elite mudalalis by accepting and rationalising the 
patronised and monopolised catch fish sharing system, the patronised labour costing 
system, the patronised and manipulated resource allocation, and informal credit 
systems. In this context indigenous social accounting systems at Kalametiya have 
facilitated the unequal power patterns and structurations of those patterns through 
time while operating in parallel with the ‘patronage political system’.  
 
Social accounting systems and the dialectic of control at Kalametiya 
As Giddens (1984) stated the central focus in structuration theory of power is the 
‘dialectic of control’, which explains power as a two-way affair between the superior 
and the subordinate, and a reciprocal relationship between autonomy and dependence 
(see also Macintosh, 1994). In all cases both parties possess some amount of power, 
i.e. even the subordinate can influence the activities of superiors, and the ability of 
one party to possess more power than the other will explain the operation of the 
‘domination’ structure. However, in the context of Kalametiya’s ‘subaltern’ society 
the influence of small-scale fishermen in the autonomy-dependency relationship 
seems rather negligible, even though some recent developments can be identified in 
their participation in, and contribution to, the ‘dialectic of control’.  
 
The authoritative and allocative resource distribution between fish-merchants and 
fishermen has influenced the fish-merchants’ ability to monitor and control the 
performances of the fishermen. The fish-merchants possess the authoritative resources 
in the form of asset ownership, controlling positions in FCS, and the social contact 
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with the regional level elite. Obviously, as the fish-merchants have a stronger 
influence in the village political economy through catch-fish sharing, resource 
allocation and informal credit systems, they tend to control the autonomy-dependency 
relationship with small fishermen. In response, the majority of fishermen have 
adapted ‘patronage’ as their livelihood strategy when exercising their agencies. In 
parallel, the social accounting systems act as a driving force facilitating the existing 
autonomy-dependency relationship. However, as a recent development, there appears 
to have been an increasing participation by the small-fishermen to the ‘dialectic of 
control’, as they have tended to gain greater control over their own budgets and 
performances than ever before as an attempted change in their indigenous social 
accounting practice. Their greater knowledge and expertise regarding the off-shore 
fishing, compared with the newly emerged asset-rich fish-merchants, the development 
of informal reciprocity-credit mutual insurance mechanisms against consumption 
shocks and risk of loss of operational capital, and changing labour relations due to the 
advent of modern fishing technology, have provided the small-fishermen with greater 
participation potential in the ‘dialectic of control’ in their autonomy-dependency 
relationship with the fish-merchants. However, this attempted change has contained 
certain limitations in relation to the fishermen’s agency because they tend to have 
very little voice and representation within the dominant discourses, and asset-rich 
fish-merchants still dominate the autonomy-dependency relationships through their 
authoritative and allocative power. As such, the ‘subalterns’ in Kalametiya are still 
forced to preserve and practice traditional indigenous social accounting systems.      
 
Concluding remarks 
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This paper presents an attempt to understand how and why ‘indigenous accounting 
practices’ have been preserved over generations in a ‘subaltern’ society, despite the 
consistent external pressures for change. It describes how social accounting practices 
are mobilised in the daily life of inhabitants and within the rural social structure. 
Although the issues relating to the presence or absence of accounting technology 
‘beyond work organisations’ have already been on the research agenda of many 
accounting studies (e.g. Choudhury, 1988; Gallhofer and Chew, 2000; Northcott and 
Doolin, 2000; Walker and Llewellyn, 2000; Jacobs and Kemps, 2002; Jayasinghe and 
Wickramasinghe, 2007), none of these studies have explicitly treated the question of 
why and how such indigenous social accounting systems are being ‘preserved’ in such 
informal settings over time. This ethnographically based investigation has revealed 
that despite having a relatively high literacy level and considerable institutional 
support, such as from the state and NGOs, the indigenous people in the case study’s  
‘subaltern’ village were unable or unwilling to change their traditional social 
accounting practices.  
 
In contrast to previous studies that identified issues of literacy, social capital and trust 
(Choudhury, 1988; Jacobs and Kemp, 2002), institutional support (Boden, 1999), or 
emotional imperatives (Northcott and Doolin, 2000), this study shows that the 
preservation and sustaining of indigenous accounting systems is explained by the 
strongly prevailing patronage political system mobilised in the ‘subaltern’ village’s 
village social structure,  making people unable to change their behaviour and practice 
either individually or collectively. It is observed that indigenous social accounting 
systems and the patronage based political system are mobilised in parallel and 
simultaneously into the village social structure and display and reflect modalities of 
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structuration (Figure 1), with indigenous accounting techniques used to facilitate the 
social construction process. As specific examples, the social accounting systems 
relating to catch-fish sharing, resource allocation, labour costing and informal credit 
and finance have become patronised and manipulated to construct the patronage 
relationships between fish-merchants and small-fishermen (e.g. in terms of ‘life long 
indebtness’ and unequal systems of accountability).  
 
While most ‘subaltern’ communities are seen as generally and inevitably reproducing 
historical social practices (rather than transforming them), because of their inability to 
influence the ‘dialectic of control’, this case study specifically indicates the  tendency 
to subconsciously reproduce and sustain indigenous accounting systems which are 
embedded and mobilised in the social systems along with the patronage relations. A 
‘duality of structure’ is specifically observed and interpreted in terms of 
‘structuration’ theory, where the prevailing social accounting systems construct 
Giddens’ modalities of structuration, in the form of interpretive schemes, norms and 
facilities, with the social actors (as fishermen or fish-merchants) placing the 
indigenous social accounting systems within the village social structure. As such, the 
social accounting systems and techniques have become the common language of  
inhabitants in their everyday life as sanctioned by patronage relationships; a unique 
form of autonomy-dependency relationship between the fishermen and fish-
merchants.  
 
Our investigation and evidence suggest that any rational transformations of 
indigenous accounting systems first require a deconstruction analysis of any 
prevailing patronage political systems that dominate subaltern social structures over 
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time. Otherwise, indigenous accounting systems at subaltern community level will 
remain preserved and sustained by its inhabitants, without major transformations. 
Such an appreciation, combined with an appropriate methodological interpretation 
and approach, will expand researcher understanding of how and why indigenous 
accounting systems have become, and remain, culturally and politically rational 
practice to inhabitants in some local ‘subaltern’ communities, and how such 
accounting techniques are used differently by different users in different social 
settings.  
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Figure 1 – Social accounting practices in a subaltern community   
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[i] Guha (1982) defines “subaltern groups” as “the people” or “nonelite.” In Weberian (1947) fashion, 
he categorises the elite into three ideal categories: dominant foreign groups, dominant indigenous 
groups, and regional and local groups which act on the behalf of the other two groups. As Spivak 
(1988) adds, the subalterns are the people who leave little or have no traces of their existence within 
elite and colonial documents (or otherwise represented only as the ‘Other’).  
 
[ii] As there is an overlap between ‘literate’ and ‘oral’ and the non-existence of pure non-literate oral 
cultures in the modern world, oral cultures does not necessarily preclude knowledge of literacy, but 
primarily manifests itself though the prevalence of oral performances (e.g. recitals, oratory, ritual and 
poetry) (Goody, 1987). 
 
[iii] Orality is used here to mean the oral use of language through speaking and listening. Researchers 
disagree about how cognitive processes change across the orality/literacy continuum, but there is broad 
consensus for the minimal view that "literacy changes the actual and possible interactions between 
people and the world" (Cole and Nicolopoulou, 1992). 
 
[iv] As Goffman (1969) observed, a total institution is an organisation, be it formal or informal, under 
which every aspect of life of organisational individuals is controlled and regulated by the 
organisational ‘authorities’. These ‘authorities’ in the total institution would be traditions, cultures, 
mores, local politics, etc.. Unlike a capitalist society, a total institution integrates the spheres of the 
modern life, i.e. work, living and recreation, through such ‘authorities’ within the physically regulated 
boundary of the organisation (see Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007). 
